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ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court Correctly Applied The Appropriate Legal Analysis in Concluding 
that Cook's Trial Counsel was Deficient in Failing to Object to the Threat Evidence 
Admitted Through Witness Nelson. 
A. Introduction 
In its brief, the State argues that the district court erred in granting Cook post 
conviction relief based upon improperly admitted threat evidence provided at trial by witness, 
Paul Nelson. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 3-13.) The State's argument is that the district court 
incorrectly applied the legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, and in doing so, erred 
in concluding that Trial Counsel's failure to object to the threat evidence fell below an objective 
standard of representation. Because the district court correctly found that Trial Counsel's failure 
to exclude this highly inflammatory and inadmissible evidence undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process at Cook's trial, the State's argument is without merit. 
B. Standard of Review 
When reviewing the district court's decision on a post-conviction case after hearing, 
the appellate court "will not disturb the lower court's factual findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous" but will "exercise free review of the district court's application of the relevant law to 
the facts." Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 233, 244, 233P.3d 164, 175 (et. App. 2010) (citing, 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376,382 (2004). 
C. The District Court Properly Applied the Legal Standard for Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel Related to Trial Counsel's Failure to Object to the Threat Evidence 
and Properly Held that Trial Counsel's Failure Fell Below an Objective Standard 
of Representation. 
1 
Claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed utilizing the two-pronged 
test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). See, McKeeth v. 
State, 140 Idaho 847, 850, 103 P.3d 460,463 (2004). To prevail on such a claim the Petitioner 
must demonstrate (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; 
and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors the result would have been 
different. Id. In evaluating whether prejudice is proved, the court "must consider the totality of 
the evidence before the judge or jury." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Milburn v. 
State, 130 Idaho 649, 653, 946 P.2d 71, 75 (Ct. App. 1997). 
When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court does not second 
guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-
conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate representation, 
ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. There is a strong 
presumption that counsel's performance fell within a wide range of professional assistance. State 
v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2007). 
At the conclusion of the post-conviction trial, the district court issued its 
Memorandum Opinion granting Cook post-conviction relief. In its Memorandum Opinion the 
district court set forth the applicable standard for admission of the threat evidence. The district 
court stated: 
The threat evidence here is arguably relevant because it is probative as to Cook's guilt. 
However, even relevant evidence may be excluded if it is unfairly prejudicial. Unfair 
prejudice occurs when the evidence somehow leads the jury to decide the case on an 
improper basis. Whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial is generally not amenable to 
broad per se rules because it is determined in the context of the facts and arguments in 
each particular case. However, evidence that is likely to arouse the jury's hostility or 
sympathy for one side without regard to the probative value of the evidence, suggests that 
it is unfairly prejudicial. 
2 
(R., pp. 395-396.) (citations omitted.) 
After setting forth the applicable legal standard for admission or exclusion of the threat 
evidence, the district court determined that had Cook's Trial Counsel moved to exclude the 
evidence, the motion would have been granted. In its rationale, the district court's stated: 
[T]he question in this case is whether the potential of the jury's emotional response to the 
evidence that Cook threatened to rape and murder Nelson's family would have caused the 
jury to decide Cook's case without regard to the evidence probative value. In the context 
of the other evidence that had been admitted at Cook's trial, Nelson's testimony about 
Cook's threats was clearly inflammatory. Given the circumstances, the probative value 
of Cook's threat was substantially outweighed by the risk of the evidence eliciting a 
strong emotional response from the jury. As a result, it is likely that a motion to suppress 
Nelson's testimony that Cook threatened to rape his wife and daughter likely would have 
been granted. TYhile it is true that a reviewing court will not second-guess strategic 
decisions of defense counsel, there is simply no strategic reason to allow highly 
iriflammatory prejudicial evidence to be admitted if it could be excluded. 
(R., p. 396.) (Emphasis added.) 
In its brief the State argues that the district court's analysis is flawed because the district 
court did not apply the legal analysis for ineffective assistance of counsel to the facts of Cook's 
case. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 8-13.) The state's argument is without merit because the district 
court not only set out the appropriate legal standard, but then concluded "there is simply no 
strategic reason to allow highly inflammatory prejudicial evidence to be admitted if it could be 
excluded." (R., p. 396.) The district court's decision in this regard was correct. 
LR.E., Rule 403 provides: "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ... " While this rule does not 
require the exclusion of all prejudicial evidence, the rule does require exclusion of evidence 
which is unfairly prejudicial such that it tends to suggest a decision on an improper basis. State v. 
Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 465, 235 P.3d 409 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 873 
P.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1994). 
3 
In Cook's case, the admitted evidence that Cook allegedly threatened Mr. Nelson, his 
family and Whitten was unfairly prejudicial. Again, Mr. Nelson's testimony of the threats 
against his family was that Cook allegedly stated that should Mr. Nelson testify at the 
preliminary hearing, Cook would have his wife and daughter followed and raped or that they 
would be taken care of. (Trial Transcript, p. 381, In. 14 - p. 389, In. 7.) Although, Mr. Nelson 
further testified that Cook had stated that Cook would have his girlfriend do the following, (Id. at 
p. 382, In. 7-11.), Mr. Nelson provided no similar testimony as to who would engage in the 
alleged rape of his wife and daughter. As a consequence of the introduction of this testimony, 
along with Mr. Nelson's further testimony of Cook desiring to escape jail so that nobody would 
be left to testify against him, raised a specter that Cook himself would rape Mr. Nelson's wife 
and daughter to keep Nelson from testifying. That is the only rational inference to be taken from 
the testimony. 
Mr. Nelson's further testimony that Cook had expressed a desire to escape from jail so 
that nobody would be left to testify against him and that he would kill Whitten so that she would 
not be able to testify, was also unfairly prejudicial. This testimony from Mr. Nelson raised the 
similar specter that Cook would have murdered Whitten prior to trial had he been released from 
jail. Thus, Mr. Nelson's ''threat testimony" suggested to the jury that Cook would freely rape 
and murder others for his benefit. The testimony painted him as a prospective rapist with 
murderous intentions that were only being held back by jail walls. The introduction of the 
"threat evidence" was so overly prejudicial to Cook's case as to deny him his constitutional right 
to a fair trial. Had Trial Counsel objected to the introduction of this evidence, the district court 
would have excluded under LR.E. 403. Accordingly, Trial Counsel was deficient in not 
4 
objecting to the introduction of this evidence; rather than stipulating that it was admissible as 
"part and parcel" of a confession. 
In this matter, the State argues that Trial Counsel's conduct in stipulating to the 
admission of the treat evidence was a strategic decision and therefore the district court erred. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 9.) The state further argues that there was neither evidence nor any finding 
of any objective shortcoming associated with that strategic decision and Cook provided no 
evidence of any shortcoming by Trial Counsel in electing in electing not to object. (Id.) Finally, 
the State argues the district court failed to find any objective shortcoming by Trial Counsel. (Id.) 
In making these arguments, the State suggests that Trial Counsel's decision not to object 
to the threat evidence was a strategic decision and not any objective shortcoming by defense 
counsel. However, Trial Counsel stated that he believed that the threat evidence was admissible 
as part and parcel of a confession. (Trial Transcript, p. 108, Ls. 4-16; p. 114, Ls. 13-18.) 
Accordingly, the appearance is that Trial Counsel's failure to object to the threat evidence was 
not occasioned by any reasoned strategy he may have possessed, but rather by ignorance of the 
applicable legal standards related to such evidence. 
Moreover, Trial Counsel's concession to the introduction of the threat evidence occurred 
during a "conference" during which the jury was not present. (Trial Transcript, pp. 107 - 129.) 
Because the jury was not present during the "conference", none of Trial Counsel's objections to 
the threat evidence would have been heard by the jury and he would not have drawn any 
attention to Mr., Nelson's threat testimony had he properly objected to it. 
Based upon these facts, it is apparent that Trial Counsel's failure to properly object to the 
threat evidence was not based upon a strategic decision he possessed, but rather to his 
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shortcoming. The district court concluded that Trial Counsel's failure to object to the 
introduction of the threat evidence constituted deficient performance and the State has failed to 
show that conclusion was in error. 
D. The District Court Correctly Found that Cook was Prejudiced by Trial Counsel's 
Deficient Performance. 
To establish prejudice, an applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the 
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. State v. 
Piro, 146 Idaho 86, 88, 190 P.3d 905, 907 (Ct. App. 2008). A reasonable probability has been 
defined as "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 499 U.S. 
at 688. The ultimate benchmark is "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a 
just result." Id at 686. In evaluating whether prejudice is proved, the court must consider the 
totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Id at 695. 
In Cook's case, the district court concluded that the threat evidence sufficiently 
undermined confidence in the outcome of Cook's trial. (R., p. 400.) The district court concluded 
that the jury could not have ignored the inflammatory nature of the threat evidence in 
determining Cook's guilt, and therefore Trial Counsel's failure to object to the threat evidence 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process at Cook's trial. (R., pp. 399-400). 
As a result, the district court concluded that Cook was prejudiced by Trial Counsel's deficient 




Based upon the forgoing, Petitioner-Appellant respectfully requests this Appellate Court 
affirm the district court's order and judgment granting post-conviction relief. 
Dated this 8th day of April, 2014. 
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